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I. INTRODUCTION 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 sets forth explicit 
requirements for a putative class of plaintiffs to be certified by a court before 
the class is able to litigate a class action suit.1  Before a court can certify a 
putative class, the class must meet the four explicit requirements set out in 
Rule 23, namely numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.2  In 
addition to these explicit requirements, however, is a requirement that the 
putative class be ascertainable.3  Notwithstanding the absence of such a 
requirement in Rule 23’s text, federal courts have long included an implicit 
ascertainability requirement for class certification.4  To be ascertainable, 
“members of a certified class must be sufficiently definite, that is, class 
members must be easily ascertained or determined using objective criteria.”5  
While all federal circuits acknowledge the existence of some form of implied 
ascertainability requirement, certain circuits have applied it differently.6 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Fairleigh Dickinson 
University.  I would like to thank my incredible wife, Jenifer, for her unrivaled support, love, 
and friendship in this endeavor and all others I have undertaken. 
 1  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 2  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4).  
 3  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 4  See DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that it is 
“elementary” that a putative class must be “adequately defined and clearly ascertainable” to 
maintain a class action); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1981) (adopting a 
stand-alone ascertainability requirement implied within Rule 23). 
 5  John H. Beisner et al., The Implicit Ascertainability Requirement for Class Actions, 
PRACTICAL LAW ARTICLE, (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/pub
lications/The%20Implicit%20Ascertainability%20Requirement%20for%20Class%20Action
s.pdf. 
 6  Compare Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 308–12 (3d Cir. 2013) (vacating 
certification of class as plaintiffs failed to meet a heightened ascertainability standard for the 
implied ascertainability requirement), and Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 
2015) (affirming the need for a heightened standard announced in Carrera and articulating a 
two-pronged heightened ascertainability standard for the implied ascertainability 
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The split among the federal circuits was created by the Third and 
Seventh Circuits’ diverging applications of the ascertainability requirement.7  
In 2015, the Third Circuit, in Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., adopted a “heightened” 
ascertainability standard comprised of a two-prong test, creating a higher 
hurdle for putative classes to certify than previous applications of 
ascertainability had contemplated.8  This version of ascertainability requires 
that a plaintiff show “(1) the class is ‘defined with reference to objective 
criteria’; and (2) there is ‘a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism 
for determining whether putative class members fall within the class 
definition.’”9  Later that year, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that 
ascertainability exists as an implicit, stand-alone, threshold requirement, but 
rejected the heightened ascertainability standard created in Byrd.10  In 
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, the Seventh Circuit instead adopted a “weak” 
version of ascertainability more favorable to small-value consumer class 
actions.11  To satisfy this version of an ascertainability requirement, a 
plaintiff need only show that class membership is defined “clearly and with 
objective criteria.”12 
Despite the highly publicized circuit split, the United States Supreme 
Court denied certiorari for the Mullins decision,13 and, more recently, 
declined to address the split again in a case out of the Sixth Circuit 
implicating the same issues.14  Additionally, in April 2015, the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee) considered whether 
ascertainability should be an independent threshold requirement for class 
certification.15  On the heels of the Supreme Court’s most recent refusal to 
address this issue, however, the Advisory Committee declined to include 
 
requirement), with Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–59 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (adopting a “weak” implied ascertainability requirement which 
requires only a clearly and objectively defined class). 
 7  Compare Carrera, 727 F.3d at 312 (applying a heightened ascertainability standard), 
and Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (applying a heightened ascertainability standard), with Mullins, 
795 F.3d at 657–59, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (applying a “weak” ascertainability 
standard). 
 8  See 784 F.3d at 163. 
 9  Id. at 163 (citing Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 10  Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
1161 (2016). 
 11  See id. 659–72. 
 12  Id. at 672. 
 13  Direct Digital, LLC v. Mullins, 136 S. Ct. 1161, 1162 (2016) (mem.). 
 14  Procter & Gamble Co. v. Rikos, 136 S. Ct. 1493, 1494 (2016) (mem.). 
 15  See generally Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Agenda Book, U.S. COURTS, 74, 77, 
254 (Apr. 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/CV2015-04.pdf 
(discussing both the Third Circuit’s approach and the Seventh Circuit’s approach to whether 
ascertainability is a criterion of class membership); see also Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions 
in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY L.J. 1569, 1607 (2016). 
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ascertainability in its proposed changes to Rule 23.16  Thus, neither the 
Supreme Court, nor the Advisory Committee, has stepped in to resolve the 
conflicting applications of an implied ascertainability requirement among 
the several federal circuits. 
Most recently, the Eighth Circuit deepened the circuit split when it 
addressed the debate over the proper application of an implied 
ascertainability requirement in Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox 
Scientific, Inc., decided in May 2016.17  The court stated that it does not 
recognize ascertainability as a separate, threshold requirement for class 
certification, but rather asserts that ascertainability should be factored into a 
“rigorous analysis” of Rule 23.18  Because the Eighth Circuit does not 
provide much in the way of analysis with respect to the standard announced 
in the case,19 lawyers and legal commentators are divided over whether the 
Eighth Circuit has created a new, third standard in applying an 
ascertainability requirement in class certification20 or whether it has merely 
joined the Seventh Circuit, and others like it, by adopting a “weak” form of 
ascertainability.21 
 
 
 
 
 16  See Amanda Bronstad, Circuit to Weigh ‘Ascertainability’ in Class Actions, 140 THE 
RECORDER 1, 1 (2016). 
 17  821 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 18  Id. at 996. 
 19  See id.  
 20  See, e.g., Eighth Circuit Declines to Adopt Separate Ascertainability Test for Class 
Action Certification, PRACTICAL LAW ARTICLE (May 6, 2016), http://us.practicallaw.com/w-
002-2175 (acknowledging that “[t]he Eighth Circuit, however, has not addressed whether 
ascertainability is a separate, preliminary requirement for class action certification); Joseph 
C. Wylie II et al., Eighth Circuit Articulates New Ascertainability Standard in TCPA Class 
Actions,  TMTLAWWATCH.COM (May 11, 2016), http://www.tmtlawwatch.com/2016/05/eigh
th-circuit-articulates-new-ascertainability-standardin-tcpa-class-actions/ (reporting that the 
Eighth Circuit rejected “heightened” ascertainability in favor of its own ascertainability 
standard); City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 443, n.3 
(3d Cir. 2017) (“The Eighth Circuit rejects the ascertainability requirement all together.”). 
 21  See, e.g., A Serious Circuit Split on Class Ascertainability, LAW360 (June 30, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/813021/a-serious-circuit-split-on-class-ascertainability 
(reporting that the Eighth Circuit has joined the Seventh Circuit in its articulation of 
ascertainability); Beasley Alleno, Eighth Circuit Adopts Favorable Class Ascertainability 
Threshold, JEREBEASLEYREPORT (Aug. 19, 2016), http://www.jerebeasleyreport.com/20
16/08/eighth-circuit-adopts-favorable-class-ascertainability-threshold/ (reporting that the 
Eighth Circuit joined the Seventh and Sixth Circuits in their articulation of an ascertainability 
standard); In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that the Second 
Circuit “join[s] the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth” in rejecting heightened 
ascertainability); see also Did the 8th Cir. Create Yet Another Class Member Test?, BUREAU 
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS (May 11, 2016), http://www.bna.com/8th-cir-create-n57982071492/ 
(presenting both positions). 
KROMKA (DO NOT DELETE) 6/25/2018  5:17 PM 
1630 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1627 
This Comment argues that the Eighth Circuit has created a third, 
distinct articulation of ascertainability that allows judges to ignore the 
requirement altogether, which only bolsters calls for reforming Rule 23.22  
Further, it urges the Advisory Committee to amend Rule 23 to include an 
explicit ascertainability requirement modeled after the Third Circuit’s 
heightened two-pronged standard.23  Part II of this Comment provides an 
explanation of the historical underpinnings of Rule 23 and the judicial 
creation of the implied ascertainability requirement.  Next, Part III describes 
the initial circuit split on the proper application of the implied 
ascertainability requirement that followed thereafter.  Part IV discusses the 
Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox Scientific decision and the Eighth 
Circuit’s treatment of ascertainability therein.  Part V argues that this version 
of ascertainability is a third, distinct standard that differs from the standard 
articulated by the Seventh and Third circuits.  In addition, Part V provides a 
potential explanation for this newly articulated standard and discusses the 
possible implications thereof.  Part VI considers the Supreme Court’s choice 
to not address the circuit split and recent Supreme Court cases that suggest 
that, if the Court addressed the issue, the Court would either adopt a “weak” 
version of ascertainability or do away with ascertainability altogether, as the 
Court has focused its decisions only on the explicit requirements of Rule 23.  
Finally, Part VII urges that the Sandusky decision, and the potential 
implications thereof, now warrants that the Advisory Committee resolve the 
circuit split by amending Rule 23 to include an explicit ascertainability 
requirement, namely one modeled after the Third Circuit’s heightened 
standard.  Part VIII concludes. 
II. JUDICIAL CREATION OF THE ASCERTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT 
A. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 23, originally promulgated in 1938, is the principle Rule of 
Federal Civil Procedure that governs the procedure and administration of 
class action lawsuits in the federal judicial system.24  The Advisory 
Committee created the modern version of Rule 23 through amendments 
made to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966.25  The amended Rule 
23 includes four explicit threshold requirements that a putative class needs 
to meet in order to certify as a class.26  The four subparts of Rule 23(a) outline 
 
 22  See infra Part V. 
 23  See infra Part VII. 
 24  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know 
Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 405 (2014). 
 25  See Mullenix, supra note 24, at 405. 
 26  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4); see also Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. 
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these requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy.27  
These explicit threshold requirements reflect the Advisory Committee’s 
desire to maintain efficiency in managing the class action device post-
amendment.28  Benjamin Kaplan, one of the principal drafters of the 
amended Rule 23, hoped that the new version of the rule would “shake the 
law of class actions free of abstract categories . . . [and] rebuild the law on 
functional lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass 
litigation.”29  A requirement that a putative class be ascertainable, however, 
is absent from the explicit requirements listed under Rule 23(a).30 
B. Genesis of the Ascertainability Requirement 
Generally, courts have agreed that Rule 23 requires a putative class be 
clearly defined by objective criteria in order to be certified.31  This 
requirement—that a class be clearly defined by objective criteria—finds its 
root in the plain language of Rule 23, which requires that “[a]n order that 
certifies a class action must define the class and the class claims, issues, or 
defenses.”32  Eventually, this requirement was dubbed “ascertainability.”33  
This ascertainability requirement, as it was initially conceived, centered on 
 
REV. 121, 132–37 (2015) (furnishing a general overview of the class certification process). 
 27  The text of Rule 23(a) reads in pertinent part: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
members only if: 
 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class. 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). 
 28  See Sarah R. Cansler, An “Insurmountable Hurdle” to Class Action Certification? The 
Heightened Ascertainability Requirement’s Effect on Small Consumer Claims, 94 N.C. L. 
REV. 1382, 1387 (2016); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendment (“Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would 
achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to 
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other 
undesirable results.”). 
 29  Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969). 
 30  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 31  See Brent W. Johnson & Emmy L. Levens, Heightened Ascertainability Requirement 
Disregards Rule 23’s Plain Language, ANTITRUST, Spring 2016, at 68; see, e.g., Matamoros 
v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 139 (1st Cir. 2012); Bakalar v. Vavra, 237 F.R.D. 59, 64 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 32  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B); see also Johnson & Levens, supra note 31, at 68. 
 33  See Johnson & Levens, supra note 31, at 68. 
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whether the class definition effectuated adequate dissemination of notice to 
class members and ensured the preclusive effects of a judgment were 
certain.34 
Moreover, shortly after the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, federal courts 
began to apply an implied ascertainability requirement when undergoing the 
class certification analysis.35  In 1970, the Fifth Circuit declared that in order 
to maintain a class action it is “elementary” that the putative class must be 
“adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.”36  Following the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision, ten years later, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged a stand-
alone ascertainability requirement, when it concluded that ascertainability is 
a proper inquiry for a district court when deciding whether to certify a 
putative class.37  In the decades following these two decisions, federal 
circuits enforced an implicit ascertainability requirement rather leniently, 
and there was little discussion among federal courts as to what its proper 
application should be.38  The implied ascertainability requirement was not 
found to be controversial during these decades because of the types of class 
action suits that the federal courts were hearing during that time.39 
The typical kind of class actions that classes brought in federal courts 
during this time were securities disputes and, usually, each class member 
was readily ascertained through the financial records involved.40  Plaintiffs 
rarely brought small-value state-law consumer class actions, such as 
 
 34  Id. 
 35  See Tom Murphy, Implied Class Warfare: Why Rule 23 Needs an Explicit 
Ascertainability Requirement in the Wake of Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 57 B.C.L. Rev. E-Supp., 
34, 38–39 (2016), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3488&conte
xt=bclr. 
 36  DeBremaecker, 433 F.2d at 734. 
 37  See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 38  See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 214 F.R.D. 125, 135–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(concluding, with little discussion, that the prospective class was ascertainable as members 
were clearly identified in MetLife insurance records); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (declaring that the 
issue of ascertainability was not implicated in the case because it was evident who owned an 
allegedly contaminated well); O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 327 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998) (holding, after only a brief discussion, that the prospective class was ascertainable 
as it was clear who lived in an area allegedly exposed to carcinogens).  See also Jamie Zysk 
Isani & Jason B. Sherry, The Ascendancy of Ascertainability as a Threshold Requirement for 
Certification, BLOOMBERG BNA, 2–3 (May 8, 2015), https://www.hunton.com/images/conte
nt/3/3/v3/3367/The-Ascendancy-of-Ascertainability.pdf; Murphy, supra note 35, at 38–39. 
 39  See Isani & Sherry, supra note 38, at 2–3. 
 40  See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (class action claim brought 
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 
U.S. 375 (1983) (securities fraud class action); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (securities fraud class action); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Secs. Litig., 183 F.3d 
970 (9th Cir. 1999) (securities fraud class action); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.3d 624 
(7th Cir. 1990) (securities fraud class action).  See also Murphy, supra note 35, at 39. 
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consumer fraud actions, in federal courts as it was nearly impossible for these 
types of class actions to meet the amount in controversy requirement,41 or 
the complete diversity requirement,42 to avoid addressing the more difficult 
questions underlying the “ascertainability” requirement.43  In 2005, however, 
Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which changed the 
requirements necessary to plead diversity for class actions,44 effectively 
opening the door to federal courts for state-law consumer class actions.45 
One of CAFA’s intended purposes was to expand federal courts’ 
discretion to exercise diversity jurisdiction over class action suits.46  To 
effectuate this purpose, CAFA includes two key features.47  First, it increases 
the amount in controversy requirement from $75,000 to $5 million, but this 
$5 million threshold requirement can be satisfied by the aggregated sum of 
each individual plaintiff’s claims.48  Second, it relaxes the “complete” 
diversity requirement, permitting jurisdiction where at least one plaintiff is 
diverse from at least one defendant in the action, or in other words, where 
“minimal diversity” exists.49  Consequently, these changes marked 
significant departures from the former threshold requirements necessary to 
plead diversity jurisdiction to bring a class action into federal court.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 41  Before the Class Action Fairness Act was passed in 2005, at least one plaintiff class 
member, individually, needed to assert a claim equal to, or in excess of, $75,000, exclusive 
of interest and costs, in order to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement necessary to 
plead diversity jurisdiction in federal courts.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 566 (2005); see also David J. Lender et al., CLASS 
ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 (CAFA): OVERVIEW 2 (2013), http://www.weil.com/~/media/
files/pdfs/CAFA_Overview.pdf.  This requirement made it difficult for small-value claims, 
where no individual plaintiff class member could him or herself assert a claim of damages for 
$75,000, to plead diversity jurisdiction. 
 42  Before the Class Action Fairness Act, parties to the suit had to maintain “complete” 
diversity, meaning that not one of the plaintiff class members could be a citizen from the same 
state as any of the defendants in the action if the class intended to plead diversity jurisdiction 
to get into federal court.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012); LENDER ET AL., supra note 41, at 1. 
 43  See Isani & Sherry, supra note 38, at 2–3. 
 44  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2018). 
 45  See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: 
A Preliminary Review, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2008) (“The scope of putative class 
actions that, at the end of the day, [CAFA] brings within the subject matter jurisdiction of 
federal courts is very broad.”); Isani & Sherry, supra note 38, at 3. 
 46  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); see also LENDER ET AL., supra note 41, at 1. 
 47  See LENDER ET AL., supra note 41, at 1. 
 48  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (6); see also LENDER ET AL., supra note 41, at 1. 
 49  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2); see also LENDER ET AL., supra note 41, at 1–2. 
 50  See LENDER ET AL., supra note 41, at 1–2. 
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In the years following the enactment of CAFA, the number of class 
action suits filed in, or removed to, federal courts substantially increased.51  
Suits filed as original proceedings in federal courts based on diversity 
jurisdiction were among this increase,52 which invariably included small-
value consumer claims that could not be brought into federal courts before 
the enactment of CAFA.  Accordingly, CAFA significantly changed the way 
putative classes could bring suit in federal courts, which, in effect, permitted 
small-value consumer class actions to make their way into federal court like 
never before. 
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO THE APPROPRIATE THRESHOLD OF THE 
ASCERTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT 
A. The Third Circuit’s Adoption of a Heightened Ascertainability 
Standard 
In the wake of CAFA, faced with many more small-value consumer 
class actions, federal circuits have had to address the difficult questions 
underlying ascertainability and have been deeply divided as to the 
appropriate application of the “ascertainability” requirement.53  The circuit 
split is best exemplified by the divergent applications of ascertainability in 
the Third and Seventh Circuits.54 
 
 
 51  See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Fed. Judicial Ctr., THE IMPACT OF THE 
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3 (2008), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CAFA0408.pdf (reporting 1370 pre-CAFA 
federal court cases compared with 2354 post-CAFA federal court cases); see also Kalee 
DiFazio, CAFA’s Impact on Forum Shopping and the Manipulation of the Civil Justice 
System, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 133 (2012); Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s 
Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593 (2008). 
 52  See LEE III & WILLGING, supra note 51, at 6 (reporting statistics on class actions filed 
as original proceedings in federal courts based on diversity jurisdiction).  In the pre-CAFA 
period studied, diversity class actions filed as original proceedings averaged 11.9 per month.  
Id.  That figure increased to 34.5 per month from March 2005 through June 2006.  Id. 
 53  Compare Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 2013) (vacating 
certification of class as plaintiffs failed to meet a heightened ascertainability standard for the 
implied ascertainability requirement), and Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 
2015) (affirming the need for a heightened standard announced in Carrera and articulating a 
two-pronged heightened ascertainability standard for the implied ascertainability 
requirement), with Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657–59 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (adopting a “weak” implied ascertainability requirement which 
requires only a clearly and objectively defined class). 
 54  Compare Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163, (adopting a two-pronged heightened ascertainability 
standard for the implied ascertainability requirement), with Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–59, cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (adopting a “weak” implied ascertainability requirement which 
requires only a clearly and objectively defined class). 
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The Third Circuit, in Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc.,55 was the first of the two 
circuits to articulate its version of implied ascertainability.  The plaintiffs in 
Byrd filed a class action suit against Aaron’s, Inc. and its franchisee store 
Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc. (“Defendants”), alleging that Defendants had 
violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).56  
One of the named plaintiffs, Crystal Byrd, entered into a lease agreement 
with Defendants, who operated a business that sold and leased residential 
and office consumer electronics, to rent a laptop computer, which 
Defendants eventually repossessed.57  One of Defendants’ agents, upon 
repossession of the laptop, presented Mrs. Byrd with a screenshot of a poker 
website that, her husband, the other named plaintiff in the action, Brian Byrd, 
had visited, in addition to a picture of him playing online poker, taken by the 
laptop’s built-in camera.58  Defendants were allegedly able to obtain the 
picture through spyware software installed on the laptop, which was capable 
of collecting screenshots, keystrokes, and images from the computer’s built-
in camera.59 
The Byrds alleged that this spyware was used by Defendants to secretly 
access the laptop 347 times on eleven different days, over the course of 
approximately one month.60  Upon filing the class action pursuant to the 
ECPA, the Byrds moved to certify the class under Rule 23, using the 
following proposed class definition: “all persons who leased and/or 
purchased one or more computers from Aaron’s, Inc., and their household 
members, on whose computers [the spyware] was installed and activated 
without such person’s consent on or after January 1, 2007.”61  The district 
court denied class certification, reasoning that the Byrds did not satisfy the 
implied ascertainability requirement for failing to define “household 
members” in the proposed class definition and failing to provide a 
mechanism for readily identifying class members.62 
On appeal, the Third Circuit took the opportunity to address the 
confusion within the Circuit as to the proper application of the implied 
ascertainability requirement.63  It pronounced a two-pronged test for 
 
 55  784 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 56  Id. at 158. 
 57  Id. at 159. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Byrd, 784 F.3d at 160. 
 62  Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., No. CIV. A. 11-101E, 2014 WL 1316055, at *5–6 (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 31, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 784 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Apr. 28, 
2015). 
 63  See Byrd, 784 F.3d at 161–62 (“[T]here has been apparent confusion in the invocation 
and application of ascertainability in this Circuit . . . . We seek here to dispel any confusion.”). 
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satisfying ascertainability, namely that a plaintiff must show that “(1) the 
class is ‘defined with reference to objective criteria’; and (2) there is ‘a 
reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether 
putative class members fall within the class definition.’”64  Although this is 
now referred to as a “heightened” ascertainability requirement, the court 
reasoned that these two inquiries were not overbearing at the class 
certification stage as the test requires only that the plaintiffs adequately 
demonstrate that the class members can be identified through some 
administratively feasible mechanism, not that they actually identify each 
class member.65  After articulating the clear two-pronged test for 
ascertainability, the court then reversed the district court’s denial of class 
certification and remanded the case to be decided under the two-prong test it 
had articulated.66 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Rejection of Heightened Ascertainability 
Less than three months after the Byrd decision, the Seventh Circuit, in 
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, rejected the Third Circuit’s articulation of an 
implied ascertainability requirement and instead adopted a “weak” form of 
ascertainability.67  The named plaintiff in Mullins, Vince Mullins, brought a 
class action pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 
Practices Act, on behalf of consumers of a medical product sold by the 
defendant, Direct Digital, LLC.68  Mr. Mullins alleged that the defendant 
fraudulently advertised the product, Instaflex Join Support (Instaflex), as 
having been clinically tested and shown to improve joint health, when really 
the product was no more than a sugar pill placebo.69  The plaintiffs moved to 
certify the class using the following proposed class definition: “all 
consumers in Illinois and states with similar laws, who purchased Instaflex 
within the applicable statute of limitations of the respective Class States, for 
personal use until the date notice is disseminated.”70  The defendant cited to 
the heightened ascertainability of the Third Circuit, particularly the one 
articulated in Carrera, in arguing that the plaintiffs failed to present the court 
with an administratively feasible method for determining which consumers 
actually purchased Instaflex in Illinois and thus should be denied class 
 
 64  Id. at 163 (citing Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 65  See id. at 163 (“[I]t does not mean that a plaintiff must be able to identify all class 
members at class certification—instead, a plaintiff need only show that ‘class members can 
be identified.’”) (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 308 n.2. (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 66  Id. at 172. 
 67  795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). 
 68  Id. at 658. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 WL 5461903, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 30, 2014), aff’d, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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certification under the implied ascertainability requirement.71  The district 
court found the defendant’s argument unpersuasive and certified the class.72 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to 
certify the putative class.73  While the court acknowledged that the Seventh 
Circuit had long recognized a stand-alone implied ascertainability threshold 
requirement for class certification, it declined to follow the heightened 
standard articulated by the Third Circuit in Byrd.74  Instead, the court applied 
a “weak” version of the implied ascertainability requirement; while this 
version of ascertainability is still a stand-alone threshold requirement for 
class certification, it stands in contrast to the Third Circuit’s heightened 
version, as it requires only that class membership be defined “clearly and 
with objective criteria.”75  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit rejected 
heightened ascertainability in favor of its “weak” form, signaling a circuit 
split as to the appropriate application of an ascertainability requirement in 
certifying putative classes. 
C. The Policy Concerns Underlying the Third Circuit’s Heightened 
Ascertainability Standard 
The Third Circuit has expressed four primary policy concerns that 
ultimately motivated its adoption of the two-pronged heightened 
ascertainability standard as articulated in the Byrd decision.76  The first, and 
most significant, of these policy concerns involves administrative 
convenience.  The Third Circuit has advocated that the heightened standard 
is necessary as it “eliminates serious administrative burdens that are 
incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class action by insisting on 
the easy identification of class members.”77  The heightened standard 
successfully does this by ensuring that class members are readily identifiable 
by the court without the need for “extensive and individualized fact-finding 
 
 71  See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 
5–6, Mullins, 2014 WL 5461903 (No. 1:13-cv-01829) (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp, 727 F.3d 
300, 305–09 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 72  Mullins, 2014 WL 5461903, at *2 (“Plaintiff’s class is ascertainable because it is 
objectively contained to all individuals who purchased Instaflex for personal use during the 
class period and the class period is finite.”). 
 73  Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657. 
 74  See id. at 657–58 (“We . . . have long recognized an implicit requirement under Rule 
23 that a class must be defined clearly and that membership must be defined by objective 
criteria . . . .  We decline to follow [the Third Circuit] . . . .  Nothing in Rule 23 mentions or 
implies [its] heightened requirement . . . .”). 
 75  See id. at 672. 
 76  See generally Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012); 
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307. 
 77  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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or mini-trials.”78 
The second policy concern involves potential unfairness to absent class 
members.  The Third Circuit has also asserted that its heightened 
ascertainability requirement is needed to protect absent class members, for 
if the identities of absent class members cannot be ascertained, it is unfair to 
bind them by the judicial proceeding.79 
Moreover, the third policy concern centers on unfairness to the bona 
fide class members.  The Third Circuit maintained that, if class members are 
identified only by their own affidavits, individuals without a valid claim will 
submit erroneous or fraudulent claims and dilute the share of recovery for 
the bona fide class members; thus, heightened ascertainability is necessary 
to protect these bona fide class members.80 
Finally, the fourth policy concern involves the due process interests of 
the defendant.  The Third Circuit averred that the heightened ascertainability 
requirement is needed to safeguard the due process rights of defendants.81  
Relying on cases about a defendant’s right to “present every available 
defense,”82 the Third Circuit asserted that the defendant in a class action suit 
must be afforded a similar right to challenge the reliability of evidence 
submitted to prove class membership.83 
In Mullins, the Seventh Circuit expressly addressed each of these policy 
concerns.84 Generally, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the same concerns 
can be addressed through careful application of the explicit requirements of 
Rule 23.85  Specifically, as to the Third Circuit’s concern over the 
administrative burdens a putative class creates and the second prong of the 
heightened standard was designed to address, the court pointed to Rule 23’s 
explicit superiority requirement as being sufficient to deal with such 
 
 78  Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79  See id. at 307; Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593. 
 80  See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310 (“It is unfair to absent class members if there is a 
significant likelihood their recovery will be diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate claims.”). 
 81  See id. at 307; see also Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594. 
 82   Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972). 
 83  See, e.g., Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (“Ascertainability provides due process by 
requiring that a defendant be able to test the reliability of the evidence submitted to prove 
class membership.”); Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 (“Forcing BMW and Bridgestone to accept as 
true absent persons’ declarations that they are members of the class, without further indicia 
of reliability, would have serious due process implications.”). 
 84  Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663–72 (7th Cir. 2015); see Johnson & 
Levens, supra note 31, at 68 for a full discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the 
Third Circuit’s policy considerations. 
 85  Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658 (asserting that objective sought by the Third Circuit’s 
heightened ascertainability standard can be better accomplished through the explicit 
“superiority” requirement of Rule 23). 
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problems.86  Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the class action device be “superior 
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”87  The Seventh Circuit asserted that Rule 23’s superiority 
requirement calls upon courts to balance the “manageability concerns” of a 
proposed class with the availability of alternatives for adjudicating a 
proposed class’s claim.88  The Seventh Circuit therefore concluded that a 
“heightened ascertainability requirement upsets this balance” by giving 
“absolute priority” to manageability concerns and ignoring the fact that 
plaintiffs with small-value claims often have no alternative to the class action 
mechanism for prosecuting such claims.89  In the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, 
heightened ascertainability has the “effect of barring class actions,” 
particularly those involving small-value claims.90 
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s heightened 
ascertainability standard for requiring courts to dismiss a potentially 
burdensome class at the outset of litigation.91  The Seventh Circuit 
maintained that its “weak” version of the implied ascertainability 
requirement, in contrast, allows the court to take a “wait and see” approach 
to potentially problematic classes, with the option to decertify a class later in 
litigation if necessary.92  Thus, it seems that under the “weak” 
ascertainability standard, courts may not necessarily need to address the 
issue of ascertainability at the class certification stage, but sometime 
thereafter. 93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86  See id. at 663. 
 87  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 88  See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658, 663. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Id. at 658. 
 91  See id. at 663–64. 
 92  See id. at 664. 
 93  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Amy R. Jonker, Is Your Putative Consumer Class 
Ascertainable? The 7th Circuit Suggests It Doesn’t Really Matter at the Certification Stage, 
FINANCIAL SERVICES L. BLOG (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.cfs-lawblog.com/is-your-putative-
consumer-class-ascertainable-the-7th-circuit-suggests-it-doesnt-matter-at-the-certification-
stage_110315. 
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IV. THE SANDUSKY WELLNESS CENTER, LLC V. MEDTOX SCIENTIFIC 
DECISION 
A. Factual Background and Procedural History of Sandusky 
The Byrd and Mullins decisions were the two principal applications of 
the implied ascertainability requirement;94 until the Eighth Circuit weighed 
in on ascertainability in Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox 
Scientific.95  In Sandusky, Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC (Sandusky), a 
chiropractic clinic, brought a class action under the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act (TCPA) arising from the clinic’s alleged receipt of an 
unsolicited facsimile advertisement from the defendant, Medtox Scientific, 
Inc., a toxicology laboratory, regarding lead testing services.96  The 
defendant decided to contact numerous doctors and health related 
organizations via fax to inform them about its lead-testing capabilities.97  To 
effectuate this plan, the defendant used a directory compiled by a health 
insurance company to create a contact list of 4,210 fax numbers by which 
the defendant transmitted a single-page fax to 3,256 numbers, including 
Sandusky’s number.98  While Sandusky, itself, was not on the list of health 
service providers given by the health insurance company to the defendant, 
one of the doctors who worked at the center had given Sandusky’s number 
to the health insurance company, effectively enabling the defendant to send 
its fax to that number.99  Important to the class action, the fax sent by the 
defendant did not include a proper opt-out notice as is required under the 
TCPA, giving rise to the underlying cause of action.100  Sandusky moved to 
certify the proposed class under the following class definition: “All persons 
who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent 
telephone facsimile messages regarding lead testing services by or on behalf 
 
 94  Compare Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (adopting a two-
pronged heightened ascertainability standard for the implied ascertainability requirement), 
with Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–59, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (adopting a “weak” 
implied ascertainability requirement which requires only a clearly and objectively defined 
class). 
 95  821 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 96  Id. at 994. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Id.  By its express terms, the TCPA applies only to unsolicited faxes.  47 U.S.C. § 
227(a)(5), (b)(1)(C) (2018).  The TCPA, however, includes an exception where a proper opt-
out notice is included in the fax.  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii).  The language of the statute 
mandates that a proper notice is one that “states that the recipient may make a request to the 
sender of the unsolicited advertisement not to send any future unsolicited advertisements to a 
telephone facsimile machine. . . .”  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3).  The fax in Sandusky did 
not include one such notice.  Sandusky, 821 F.3d at 994. 
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of Medtox, and (3) which did not display a proper opt out notice.”101  The 
district court denied class certification, holding that the putative class was 
“not ascertainable, because it [did] not objectively establish who is included 
in the class” as it was unclear whether the class included the owner of a fax 
machine receiving an injurious fax, the actual recipient of such a fax, or 
both.102 
B. The Eighth Circuit’s Articulation of Ascertainability 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that other circuits have 
recognized a stand-alone implied ascertainability threshold requirement for 
class certification under Rule 23 and the circuit split as to the appropriate 
application of the requirement, namely the Third Circuit’s heightened 
requirement and the Seventh Circuit’s “weak” standard.103  In articulating its 
own standard, the court declared that the Eighth Circuit “has not addressed 
ascertainability as a separate, preliminary requirement,” but rather “adheres 
to a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements, which includes that a class 
‘must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.’”104  Under this 
articulation, the court held that the proposed class was ascertainable through 
fax logs showing the recipients of the fax, which serves as sufficient 
objective criteria for ascertainability.105  Nevertheless, the court provided 
little in the way of analysis with respect to its articulation of ascertainability 
and how it should be applied, moving forward, within the Eighth Circuit.106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 101  Sandusky, 821 F.3d at 994. 
 102  Sandusky Wellness Ctr. LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., No. CIV. 12-2066 DSD/SER, 2014 
WL 3846037, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 5, 2014), rev’d, 821 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 103  Sandusky, 821 F.3d at 994. 
 104  Id. at 995. 
 105  Id. at 997. 
 106  See id. at 996. 
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V. THE NEW SANDUSKY STANDARD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
A. Sandusky Established a Third and Distinct Standard for 
Ascertainability 
The issue coming out of the Sandusky decision is whether the Eighth 
Circuit has articulated a new standard for applying the implied 
ascertainability requirement,107 or rather, whether the Eighth Circuit merely 
joined the Seventh Circuit, and others like it, in adopting the “weak” standard 
of implied ascertainability.108  This Comment takes the position that 
Sandusky did in fact create a new, distinct standard of ascertainability.  The 
principle difference between the Seventh Circuit’s “weak” standard for 
implied ascertainability and the articulation pronounced by the Eighth 
Circuit in Sandusky is that the Seventh Circuit recognized the implied 
ascertainability requirement as a stand-alone requirement for class 
certification, whereas the opinion in Sandusky seems to suggest that the 
Eighth Circuit did not recognize ascertainability as a stand-alone threshold 
requirement.109  This is consistent with criticism of Sandsuky from 
commentators like David Almeida, a defense attorney specializing in class 
actions, who averred that the Eighth Circuit’s decision “‘goes to the left of 
the Seventh Circuit,’” creating an even weaker test.110  It has even been 
suggested that the standard articulated in Sandusky is a “non-test,”111 and is 
an analysis based strictly on the language of Rule 23.112  Unlike the Seventh 
Circuit’s standard, which requires judges to affirmatively address the issue 
of ascertainability in their class certification analysis, the Eighth Circuit’s 
 
 107  See, e.g., PRACTICAL LAW ARTICLE, supra note 20 (acknowledging that “[t]he Eighth 
Circuit, however, has not addressed whether ascertainability is a separate, preliminary 
requirement for class action certification); Wylie II, supra note 20 (reporting that the Eighth 
Circuit rejected “heightened” ascertainability in favor of its own ascertainability standard); 
City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of N. Am. Inc., 867 F.3d 434, 443, n.3 (3d Cir. 
2017) (“The Eighth Circuit rejects the ascertainability requirement all together.”). 
 108  See, e.g., LAW360, supra note 21 (reporting that the Eighth Circuit has joined the 
Seventh Circuit in its articulation of ascertainability); Alleno, supra note 21 (reporting that 
the Eighth Circuit joined the Seventh and Sixth Circuits in their articulation of an 
ascertainability standard); In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 265 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that 
the Second Circuit “join[s] the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth” in rejecting heightened 
ascertainability); see also BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 21 (presenting both 
positions). 
 109  Compare Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We and 
other courts have long recognized an implicit requirement under Rule 23 that a class must be 
defined clearly and that membership be defined by objective criteria.”), with Sandusky, 821 
F.3d at 996 (“[T]his court has not addressed ascertainability as a separate, preliminary 
requirement.  Rather, this court adheres to a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements, 
which includes that a class ‘must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.’”). 
 110  BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 21. 
 111  See id. (asking whether the Sandusky standard may be a new test or even a “non-test”). 
 112  See Wylie II, supra note 20. 
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standard effectively allows judges, at their discretion, to give as much weight 
to ascertainability as they like or dispense of an ascertainability requirement 
altogether, without weighing it into their analyses at all. 
Although Sandusky is a recent decision, the standard it articulated has 
already been interpreted by district courts within the Eighth Circuit in 
support of this position.  For example, a district court in Missouri, 
interpreting the language of Sandusky, held in two cases that implied 
ascertainability is not a separate requirement for a putative class to certify.113  
In Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the court decided a case 
involving a putative class of State Farm Fire and Casualty policyholders for 
an alleged breach of contract concerning their insurance policies.114  Citing 
to Sandusky, the district court rejected defendant State Farms’ claim that 
ascertainability is a stand-alone requirement necessary to certify a class.115  
The district court addressed adequacy of class definition and ascertainability 
as part of a “rigorous analysis” as pronounced by Sandusky; however, it did 
so as part of an analysis of the four explicit requirements of Rule 23, 
generally, rather than an analysis of ascertainability as a stand-alone 
threshold requirement.116 
Additionally, in Lafollette v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the 
same court also decided a similar case involving a putative class of Liberty 
Mutual Fire Insurance policyholders.117  Once again, citing to Sandusky, the 
district court rejected defendant Liberty Mutual’s claim that ascertainability 
is a stand-alone requirement necessary to certify as a class.118  Again, the 
district court addressed adequacy of class definition and ascertainability as 
part of a “rigorous analysis” as pronounced by Sandusky; however, it did so 
specifically under its analysis of the explicit requirement of predominance 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3).119 
Most recently, in In re Hardieplank Fiber Cement Siding Litigation, a 
district court in Minnesota, citing to Sandusky, seemingly did not include 
ascertainability in its class certification analysis.120  Although the court 
observed that “[i]n the Eighth Circuit, the question of whether a proposed 
class is clearly ascertainable is answered as part of the rigorous analysis 
 
 113  See Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 315 F.R.D. 503, 511 (W.D. Mo. 2016), 
leave to appeal granted (Sept. 9, 2016), rev’d sub nom.  In re State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
872 F.3d 567 (8th Cir. 2017), reh’g denied (Oct. 31, 2017); Lafollette v. Liberty Mut. Fire 
Ins. Co., No. 2:14-CV-04147-NKL, 2016 WL 4083478, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2016). 
 114  315 F.R.D. at 509. 
 115  Id. at 511. 
 116  Id. at 512, n.5. 
 117  No. 2:14-CV-04147-NKL, 2016 WL 4083478, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2016). 
 118  Id. at *5. 
 119  Id. at *5, n.6. 
 120  No. 12-MD-2359, 2018 WL 262826 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 2018). 
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performed under Rule 23,” considerations of ascertainability are decidedly 
absent from the court’s analyses for each of the explicit Rule 23 threshold 
requirements thereafter.121  Thus, in effect, the district court did not explicitly 
include ascertainability into its decision to deny the plaintiffs’ motion to 
certify the putative class in that case.122  Whether ascertainability was 
implicitly weighed into these analyses cannot be discerned from the text of 
the court’s issued opinion.123 
These decisions demonstrate that the Eighth Circuit’s articulation of 
ascertainability allows judges within the circuit to fold an inquiry on 
ascertainability, based on whether a class is “adequately defined and clearly 
ascertainable,”124 into their overall analyses of Rule 23 generally, into an 
analysis of one of explicit threshold requirements of Rule 23, or to ostensibly 
dispense with the ascertainability requirement in their class certification 
analyses altogether.  The Eighth Circuit’s decision may signal a return to the 
original text of Rule 23, one that does not include an explicit ascertainability 
requirement.125  This articulation may also demonstrate an attempt by the 
Eighth Circuit to give judges more discretion in deciding whether to certify 
a putative class at the class certification stage by allowing judges to choose 
whether to consider ascertainability as a factor, rather than a stand-alone 
requirement, in their analyses of the four explicit requirements of Rule 23.126  
This approach differs markedly from the Third Circuit’s heightened 
standard, which not only considers ascertainability to be an implicit, stand-
alone, requirement for class certification, but also requires a plaintiff to 
satisfy its two-prong inquiry.127  The former is a discretionary standard with 
a low threshold, whereas the latter is a non-discretionary standard with a high 
threshold, putting the two in stark contrast with one another.  Accordingly, 
in the wake of Sandusky, there now exist three separate and distinct standards 
used among the federal courts in applying ascertainability to class 
certification under Rule 23.128 
 
 121  Id. at *13–16. 
 122  See id. at *1–20. 
 123  See id. 
 124  See Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 
2016). 
 125  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 126  See Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n of Omaha, Local 385 v. Zalewski, 678 F.3d 640, 645 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (“The district court is accorded broad discretion to decide whether certification is 
appropriate . . . .”) (citing Rattray v. Woodbury Cnty., Ia., 614 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
 127  Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Hayes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013)). 
 128  Compare Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2015) (articulating 
a stand-alone, albeit, “weak” implied ascertainability requirement for class certification), with 
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (articulating a “heightened” stand-alone,  implied ascertainability 
requirement for class certification), and Sandusky, 821 F.3d at 995–96 (holding that 
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B. Potential Implications of the New Sandusky Standard 
The Sandusky articulation of ascertainability is not a stand-alone 
threshold requirement to class certification that a putative class has the 
burden to prove.  Rather, it encompasses a more flexible version of 
ascertainability whereby judges are at liberty to incorporate an 
ascertainability inquiry into their overall analyses of the explicit 
requirements of Rule 23, or choose to disregard such an inquiry altogether.129  
This articulation of ascertainability may give judges too much discretion in 
deciding when to certify a class, especially if such decisions rest on varying 
opinions depending on a particular judge’s view on the necessity and/or 
weight of the requirement.130  The potential for arbitrary application of 
ascertainability means that both plaintiffs and defendants will be unable to 
reasonably anticipate how ascertainability will be weighed into the “rigorous 
analysis” of Rule 23 by a given judge, or whether it will be factored in at all.  
One commentator also argues that the vagueness of this approach also allows 
judges to delve into the merits of a particular class action case at the class 
certification stage, which is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.131 
Furthermore, the split among the circuits as to the proper application of 
Rule 23 runs afoul of the principle that the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure 
are intended to be applied uniformly across all federal circuits.132  With the 
availability of three standards, two of which are more favorable to plaintiffs, 
class counsel now have the ability to forum shop between the circuits with 
lower ascertainability standards in order to ensure the class action will 
continue past the class certification stage.  Likewise, defendants who wish 
 
ascertainability is not a stand-alone requirement, but rather is to be considered as part of a 
“rigorous analysis” of Rule 23). 
 129  See Sandusky, 821 F.3d at 996 (“[T]his court has not addressed ascertainability as a 
separate, preliminary requirement.  Rather, this court adheres to a rigorous analysis of 
the Rule 23 requirements, which includes that a class ‘must be adequately defined and clearly 
ascertainable.’”). 
 130  Compare Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 315 F.R.D. 503, 512 (W.D. Mo. 
2016), leave to appeal granted (Sept. 9, 2016), rev’d sub nom. In re State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 872 F.3d 567 (8th Cir. 2017), reh’g denied (Oct. 31, 2017) (folding ascertainability 
generally into the explicit requirements of Rule 23), with Lafollette v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co., No. 2:14-CV-04147-NKL, 2016 WL 4083478, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 1, 2016) (folding 
ascertainability specifically into its analysis of predominance pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3)), and 
In re Hardieplank Fiber Cement Siding Litig., No. 12-MD-2359, 2018 WL 262826, at *1–20 
(D. Minn. Jan. 2, 2018) (affirming that in the Eighth Circuit, ascertainability is assessed in 
analyses of the explicit threshold requirements of Rule 23, but not explicitly addressing 
ascertainability in the court’s analyses of these requirements). 
 131  Rhys J. Williams, Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. Medtox Scientific, Inc.: The 
Eighth Circuit Joins the Ascertainability Standard Conversation, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 155, 
172–73 (2016) (“This lack of guidance could result in an impermissible expansion of 
ascertainability analysis, which leads to an improper evaluation of the merits of a case when 
certification should be the only question answered by Rule 23.”). 
 132  See Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 86 (1959). 
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to block class certification, assuming legitimate transfer arguments can be 
made,133 may attempt to transfer to district courts within the Third Circuit, 
as the heightened ascertainability requirement gives defendants a better 
opportunity to block class certification.134  As such, Sandusky has deepened 
the previously existing circuit split by establishing a third ascertainability 
standard that class plaintiffs may try to utilize in certifying a class and by 
creating the potential for arbitrary application of the standard within the 
Eighth Circuit by district court judges. 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT DECISIONS ON RULE 23 SUGGEST IT 
WOULD ADOPT A “WEAK” FORM OF ASCERTAINABILITY 
After the Seventh Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s heightened 
ascertainability standard in Mullins, the Supreme Court was petitioned to 
review the split, but declined to extend certiorari to the Mullins case.135  The 
Supreme Court again avoided addressing the ascertainability issue by 
denying certiorari as to a Sixth Circuit decision that also rejected heightened 
ascertainability.136  In addition to declining to address the issue of an implied 
ascertainability requirement, recent Supreme Court decisions have focused 
on the explicit requirements of Rule 23.137 
In Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, the United States Supreme Court 
explained that at the class certification stage: 
 
a party must not only be prepared to prove that there are in fact 
sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, 
typicality of claims or defenses, and adequacy of 
representation . . . [t]he party must also satisfy through 
evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b).138 
 
 
 133  28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2018) governs when party litigants may transfer venue in federal 
court.  Specifically, paragraph (a) under the statute provides that “[f]or the convenience of 
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to 
any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to 
which all parties have consented.”  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  As such, litigants that can make a 
legitimate case for transfer of venue may be able to have a case transferred from one district 
court to another that is more desirable to that party. 
 134  See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2018) for the requirements governing transfer of venue amongst 
the federal district courts. 
 135  Direct Digital, LLC v. Mullins, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). 
 136  Procter & Gamble Co. v. Rikos, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2016). 
 137  See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (focusing on the explicit 
requirements of Rule 23 in outlining the required showing of a putative class to certify); Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011) (refusing to read substantive provisions 
into the text of Rule 23). 
 138  569 U.S. at 33 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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In the majority opinion, the Court mentions nothing regarding a showing of 
ascertainability when expounding upon a putative class plaintiff’s burden on 
a motion for class certification.139 
Likewise, the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes also 
chose not to read substantive provisions into the text of Rule 23.140  
Specifically, the Court refused to clarify Rule 23 based on the Advisory 
Committee Notes where the suggested clarification had “no basis in the 
Rule’s text” and did “obvious violence to the Rule’s structural features.”141  
The Court instead held that “it is the Rule itself, not the Advisory 
Committee’s description of it, that governs.”142  These decisions demonstrate 
that the Supreme Court has concerned itself only with the explicit 
requirements of Rule 23 in assessing issues of class certification.143  
Although some commentators have concluded otherwise,144 these decisions 
seem to suggest that if the Supreme Court does decide to address the issue 
of ascertainability, it is likely to adopt some weaker form of ascertainability, 
possibly one akin to the Eighth Circuit’s articulation which emphasizes the 
four explicit requirements of Rule 23, or dispense with ascertainability 
altogether.  As will be set out below, however, heightened ascertainability 
offers a superior standard and, as such, the Advisory Committee should 
amend the Rule to include an explicit ascertainability requirement modeled 
after the Third Circuit’s two-pronged test.145 
VII. THE NEED TO AMEND RULE 23 TO INCLUDE AN EXPLICIT 
ASCERTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT MODELED AFTER THE THIRD 
CIRCUIT’S HEIGHTENED STANDARD IN THE WAKE OF SANDUSKY 
A. The Heightened Ascertainability Standard Is Superior to the 
“Weak” Ascertainability Standard for Effective Management of 
the Class Action Device 
In the wake of Sandusky, three versions of ascertainability, each 
differing in the degree as to the required threshold, now exist among the 
several circuits, effectively varying a given putative class’s ability to certify 
depending on the circuit in which suit is brought.  As noted above, however, 
 
 139  See id. 
 140  564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 141  Id. at 338. 
 142  Id. at 363. 
 143  See also Johnson & Levens, supra note 31, at 68. 
 144  See Cansler, supra note 28, at 1384 (noting that prior to denying review of Mullins, 
the Supreme Court’s class action decisions suggested that the Court would be in favor of the 
heightened standard). 
 145  See infra Part VII. 
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the Supreme Court has already twice declined to address this issue,146 and 
recent decisions involving class actions suggest that the Court’s focus on the 
explicit requirements of Rule 23 would lead it to either adopt a weaker 
ascertainability standard or reject ascertainability as a threshold requirement 
altogether.147  Thus, because heightened ascertainability is a superior 
standard, it is incumbent upon the Advisory Committee to address the issue 
of ascertainability.  Specifically, the Advisory Committee should determine 
that the Third Circuit’s heightened standard is the appropriate application of 
the ascertainably requirement and should amend Rule 23 to include it as an 
explicit threshold requirement for class certification. 
As set forth above, the Third Circuit adopted a heightened 
ascertainability standard to address four policy concerns, chief among them 
being administrative convenience.148  The Seventh Circuit, in rejecting 
heightened ascertainability, asserted that the Third Circuit’s approach places 
too much emphasis on manageability concerns, potentially barring small-
value consumer claims.149  The Seventh Circuit, however, failed to make 
clear how a “weak” standard will satisfy the need for efficiency that makes 
common issues predominate under Rule 23(b)(3).150  It is also unclear “how 
this process will work in conjunction with Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement to 
satisfy predominance and superiority.”151  In this regard, while the Seventh 
Circuit raised valid concerns regarding the burden that heightened 
ascertainability may create for small-value consumer claims, the precision 
offered by the heightened standard, as compared to the “weak” standard, in 
managing putative classes at the outset of litigation makes it a more efficient 
and desirable standard. 
Further, heightened ascertainability is not a death knell to a putative 
class in a small-value consumer class action as portended by the Seventh 
Circuit.  The Third Circuit made clear in Byrd that the two-prong test is 
“narrow” and “does not mean that a plaintiff must be able to identify all class 
members at class certification—instead, a plaintiff need only show that class 
members can be identified.”152  This does not create some insurmountable 
obstacle for putative classes in small-value consumer actions to overcome.  
Rather, it places on plaintiffs a reasonable and sensible burden that they can 
readily meet. 
 
 146  Direct Digital, LLC v. Mullins, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016); Procter & Gamble Co. v. 
Rikos, 136 S. Ct. 1493 (2016). 
 147  See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 27 (2013); see also Wal-Mart Stores, 564 
U.S. at 338. 
 148  See supra Part III. 
 149  See supra Part III. 
 150  See Jonker, supra note 93. 
 151  See id. 
 152  Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). 
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For example, in Martinez-Santiago v. Public Storage,153 a consumer 
class action brought in the District Court of New Jersey, the court found the 
putative class to be ascertainable in applying the two-prong inquiry 
articulated in Byrd.154  Specifically, as to Byrd’s second-prong requiring a 
mechanism for identifying class members, the court held that it was 
“relatively straightforward, since it requires only an examination of 
Defendant’s business records.”155  Also, as one commentator has observed, 
modern technology also affords class plaintiffs facile means for meeting the 
burdens placed on a putative class under the heightened standard.156  Thus, 
while it may be more difficult for small-value consumer claims to certify as 
class actions under heightened ascertainability, there certainly is more room 
for small-value consumer claims under the heightened standard than the 
Seventh Circuit suggests.157 
B. The Heightened Ascertainability Standard Better Comports with 
the Original Intent of Rule 23 
Furthermore, it has been advanced that the Third Circuit’s heightened 
version of the ascertainability requirement does not comport with the 
original intent behind amended Rule 23.158  The heightened standard, 
however, does in fact comport with the drafter’s intent of maintaining 
efficiency in managing the class action device after amending Rule 23.159  
Particularly, by requiring a putative class to demonstrate membership at the 
certification stage, the heightened ascertainability standard ensures that 
small-value consumer claims comply with one of Rule 23’s most important 
purposes: to “achieve economics of time, effort, and expense” through class 
actions.160 
 
 153  312 F.R.D. 380 (D.N.J. 2015). 
 154  Id. at 387. 
 155  Id. at 388–89. 
 156  Stephanie Starek, Navigating the Ascertainability Spectrum: Analyzing the Policy 
Rationales Behind the Various Ascertainability Standards as Applied to Small-Value 
Consumer Class Actions, 68 CASE W. RES. 213, 240–41 (2017) (“Potential class members can 
simply scan their email for their grocery store receipt and then submit proof that they are class 
members.  Not only can technology help consumers prove their class membership, it can also 
help courts send adequate notice to class members.”). 
 157  See Cansler, supra note 28, at 1406. 
 158  See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 35, at 34, 49 (arguing that the heightened ascertainability 
standard does not comport with the intent of the drafters of Rule 23, as the rule’s purpose was 
to accommodate small-value class actions). 
 159  Cansler, supra note 28, at 1387. 
 160  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment 
(“Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve 
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons 
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable 
results.”). 
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The need to effectively manage the administration of class actions 
became particularly vital after Congress passed CAFA in 2005.161  This is 
because CAFA opened the door to federal courts for consumer class action 
suits that plaintiffs previously could not file in federal court,162 signaling a 
dramatic change in federal class action jurisprudence not likely contemplated 
by Rule 23’s drafters.  The ensuing increase in class actions brought in 
federal court after CAFA’s enactment included suits filed as original 
proceedings based on diversity jurisdiction.163  The suits invariably included 
the kinds of class actions that implicate the concerns voiced by the Third 
Circuit with respect to administrative convenience.  Further, more recently, 
there has been “a steady increase in consumer class action settlements,”164 
caused, in part, by a boom in small-value consumer class actions such as 
food labeling actions, consumer privacy actions, and actions involving 
violations of the TCPA.165  It is these kinds of class actions that largely 
implicate the policy concerns voiced by the Third Circuit.  The Third 
Circuit’s heightened ascertainability serves to address the real manageability 
concerns that the drafters had with,166 and that federal courts face in, 
certifying putative classes, particularly in a post-CAFA world.167  
Accordingly, heightened ascertainability serves the very ends that motivated 
the drafters of Rule 23 to amend the rule in the first place. 
 
 
 
 161  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2018); see also Burbank, supra note 45, at 1441; Isani & 
Sherry, supra note 38, at 3. 
 162  See Burbank, supra note 45, at 1441; Isani & Sherry, supra, note 38, at 3. 
 163  See LEE III & WILLGING, supra note 51, at 6 (reporting statistics on class actions filed 
as original proceedings in federal courts based on diversity jurisdiction).  In the pre-CAFA 
period studied, diversity class actions filed as original proceedings averaged 11.9 per month.  
Id.  That figure increased to 34.5 per month from March 2005 through June 2006.  Id. 
 164  Stephanie Plancich, et al., Consumer Class Action Settlements: 2010—2013 
Settlements Increasing, with a Focus on Privacy, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING (Jul. 22, 
2014), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_Consumer_Class
_Action_Settlements_0614.pdf.  
 165  Christopher M. Murphy, The Rise of Smaller Class Actions, MWE (Aug. 6, 2014), 
https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/publications/2014/08/the-rise-of-smaller-
class-actions. 
 166  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment 
(“Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve 
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons 
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable 
results.”). 
 167  LEE III & WILLGING, supra note 51, at 1–2 (reporting on a study measuring the 
dramatic increase in class action lawsuits brought in federal courts post-CAFA). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Uniformity in the rules governing civil procedure in the federal judicial 
system offers a desirable certainty and predictability to would-be litigants.  
In the wake of Sandusky, however, three distinct applications of 
“ascertainability” now exist among the federal circuits.168  The drafters of 
amended Rule 23 intended to “shake the law of class actions free of abstract 
categories.”169  As such, implied ascertainability has become one such 
abstraction due to its disparate application as among the federal circuits.170  
Amending Rule 23 to include an explicit ascertainability requirement would 
shake the law of class actions free from implied ascertainability once and for 
all. 
While others have called for the Advisory Committee to amend Rule 
23 to include a “weak” form of ascertainability as adopted by the Seventh 
Circuit,171 this Comment takes the position that the Advisory Committee 
should elect to model its amendment after the two-prong test originally 
pronounced by the Third Circuit in Byrd.172  This heightened articulation of 
ascertainability best comports with the intent of Rule 23’s drafters, namely 
the efficient and effective management of the class action device.  Given the 
rise of class actions filed in and removed to federal courts in a post-CAFA 
world and the continuing trend in the increase of small-value consumer class 
actions, heightened ascertainability offers the kind of precision needed to 
ensure that class actions, in all of their immensities and complexities, still 
remain sufficiently manageable. 
While it is not within the scope of this Comment to resolve all 
inconsistencies among the federal circuits as to their respective applications 
of Rule 23, this much is clear: under this conception of a newly amended 
Rule 23, plaintiff classes will still effectively prosecute their claims, 
 
 168  Compare Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(articulating a stand-alone, albeit, “weak,” implied ascertainability requirement for class 
certification), with Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (articulating a 
“heightened,” stand-alone, implied ascertainability requirement for class certification), and 
Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding 
that ascertainability is not a stand-alone requirement, but rather is to be considered as part of 
a “rigorous analysis” of Rule 23). 
 169  Kaplan, supra note 29, at 497. 
 170  Murphy, supra note 35, at 34. 
 171  See Murphy, supra note 35 for the position that Rule 23 should be amended to include 
the Seventh Circuit’s “weak” version of ascertainability.  This position focuses primarily on 
the potential hurdle posed to small-value consumer class actions under the heightened 
standard.  Id. 
 172  Amending Rule 23 to include an explicit ascertainability requirement modeled after 
the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard is also consistent with recent 
congressional efforts to codify heightened ascertainability.  See Fairness in Class Action 
Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 1718(a) (2017).  For a discussion of the 
rationale underlying the promulgation of this bill, see Starek, supra, note 156, at 238–39. 
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defendants’ due process rights will successfully be safeguarded, and all 
federal courts, irrespective of the particular forum, will undertake the process 
of certifying putative classes consistently across the federal circuits. 
 
